Energy Security Approach in Japan's Foreign Policy 1945-1973

Mandana Tishehyar[1]

Abstract

Although Japanese energy consumption has been among the highest in the world, the country lacks significant domestic energy resources and most imports include substantial amount of crude oil, natural gas and other energy resources. Japan's reliance on the import of fuel and energy was felt more than ever after the Second World War when Japan tried to join the rank of the powerful industrialized countries. As a result, the Japanese policy-makers tried to find long term adjustments and solutions to maintain energy security.

The main aim of this article is to study the foreign policies and strategies of Japan in the period between the end of the World War II in 1945 and the first oil shock in 1973 for achieving energy efficiency and security and the impact of international system on those policies and strategies. The main hypothesis in this research is that Japan's struggle for maintaining energy security was based on a kind of "increased dependency" and reliance on multinational oil companies and major state powers.

Key words: Japan, Energy, Security, Foreign policy

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1. PhD of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New-Delhi, India & Lecturer, University of Tehran, Iran.
E-mail: mandana.tishehyar@gmail.com

Introduction

Japan's rapid economic growth in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s has put this most energy-deficient country at the mercy of energy export countries. Its rapid industrial expansion was accompanied by a sharp increase in the consumption of raw materials, making Japan not only an enormous consumer, outstripped only by the United States, but also the world's largest importer of raw materials.

In contrast to the US, Japanese energy consumption has been among the highest in the world, the country lacks significant domestic energy resources and most imports include substantial amount of crude oil, natural gas and other energy resources. Japan’s reliance on the import of fuel and energy was felt more than ever after the Second World War when Japan tried to join the rank of the powerful industrialized countries. As a result, the Japanese policy-makers tried to find long term adjustments and solutions to maintain energy security. However, regarding to Japan's commitment to the Western bloc during the Cold War, its energy policies affected by the structure of international order.

The main objective of this article is study the foreign policies and strategies of Japan in the period between the end of the World War II in 1945 and the first oil shock in 1973 for achieving energy efficiency and security and the impact of international system on those policies and strategies. The main hypothesis is that Japan's struggle for maintaining energy security was based on a kind of "increased dependency" and reliance on multinational oil companies and major state powers. With this regard, in this paper, I will attempt to do a review on the events, elements and doctrines that have impacted the main approaches in Japan's foreign policy regarding energy security during the mentioned period.

A. Paradigmatic Strategic Change in Japan's Foreign Policy and the Rising Need in Energy

After 1945, Japan shifted its Grand National strategy from militarism to mercantilism, the Meiji's slogan of "powerful country, strong army" changed to "powerful country, strong economy". (Oldfather, 1996, 259)

The economic system in Japan became a mixture of free market competition and strong state intervention called as a "plan-oriented market economy". (Buckley, 1998: 62)

During the new trend of industrialization process and economic development of Japan, in some cases, the consumption of key resources during this period increased at a rate faster than that of economic growth. Thus, while the economy grew at an annual rate of 11.1 per cent between 1960 and 1970, the consumption of oil increased by 20.4 per cent, aluminum by 19 per cent, iron ore by 18.1 per cent, nickel by 17 per cent and natural gas by 16.9 per cent. (Akao, 1983, 15) & (Hashemi, July 2001)

Throughout the 1950s, there was a steady shift in Japanese energy consumption from coal to oil. In 1950 coal supplied over 50 per cent of Japan's energy needs and between 1961 and 1971 coal's share of primary energy declined from 31.3 per cent to 8.1 per cent, its production from 55 to 31 million tons, its mines from 570 to 68, and its work force from 210000 to 40000. It declined from 56 per cent of electric power in 1965 to 5.1 per cent in 1975. (Nester, 1991: 131)

Actually, the share of oil in Japan's primary energy supply rose steeply from a mere 17.7 per cent in 1953 to 37.7 per cent in 1960, 58.4 per cent in 1965 and 70.8 per cent in 1970. The volume of her crude oil imports also rose absolutely from 564,000 b/d (barrels per day) in 1960 to 1.5 million b/d in 1965 and 3.4 million b/d in 1970. The bulk of these came from the Middle East which was responsible for 80.1 per cent of her total imports in 1960, and 84.7 per cent in 1970. (Campbell, 1985, 134)

From the end of the war through the 1960s, access to resources was not viewed as a major problem in Japan. Seemingly infinite supplies of oil, coal, iron ore, and other resources were readily available at low costs from overseas. In the late 1950s and the first half of the 1960s the major aim of MITI was to keep the costs of refined oil as low as possible for Japan's heavy and chemical industries, but not to provide the private sector with financial and technical assistance for risky and expensive oil exploration ventures abroad. This was due to the glut of oil in the world market; the oil refiners in Japan could purchase low cost crude oil from the majors without difficulty. Indeed, the imported oil prices in the country declined sharply during the period. Taking 1955 as 100, the index price fell to 85.7 in 1960, 71.1 in 1965 and 64.8 in 1970. It then rose to 89.5 in 1973, but was still lower than that in 1955. (Shimizu, 1993, 50) Cheap oil undoubtedly played a great role in Japan's so called economic miracle in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the early postwar period, Japan's complete reliance on the major international oil firms for petroleum products allowed these firms to become dominant in the refining of oil and the distribution of petroleum products within Japan. Oil was the only major Japanese industry[1] in which foreign capital was able to gain substantial equity participation.

It is therefore not surprising to find that in 1965 the crude oil, supplied by the foreign oil companies, accounted for some 70 per cent of Japan's total imports, while the Khafji oil together with the oil produced by another Japanese oil company, the North Sumatra Oil Co. set up in 1960 was responsible for a mere 12.9 per cent. (Shimizu, 1993, 50) & (Lincoln, 1993, 53)

During the passing decades, the situational changes in the international environment of Japan have made it to reconsider its security policies on energy. Since then, Japan has shifted its policy from less dependency to comparative advantage policy, virtually translated into "increased dependency" on energy sources provided by the seven sisters. With the notable exception of Japanese investment in the Arabian Oil Company, through the mid-1960s Japanese overseas investment in natural resources exploitation was negligible.

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1. Electronic computers at this early date were still rather exotic.

On the other hand, there was considerable fear that increased dependency on foreign oil would mean the domination of Japan's energy supply by the "seven sister" oil majors. Although MITI responded to these fears and coal industry pressured by temporarily switching the energy emphasis from oil back to coal in 1954, it then reversed its policy once more the following year with the arguments that since oil was cheaper than coal, it would aim the comparative advantage of Japanese products and thus help Japan's balance of payments. In result, by 1962 Japan was the second largest importer of Middle East oil after Britain; after 1970 it was the largest.

Japanese Dependence on the Majors (1972)

(Thousand kiloliters)

		Quantity	Percentage
Majors:	Caltex	31,442	16.1
	Esso	20,115	10.3
	Mobil	17,772	9.1
	Gulf	14,842	7.6
	Shell	23,826	12.2
	British Petroleum	2,344	1.2
	CFP (France)	4,296	2.2
	TOTAL	114,637	58.7
Other Foreign Companies:	Getty	8,202	4.2
	UNOCO	9,569	4.9
	Other U.S. corporations	5,078	2.6
	Soviet Union Oil Export Corp.	1,953	1.0
Japanese Companies:	Arabian Oil	18,553	9.5
	North Sumatra Oil	586	0.3
	Others	36,716	18.8
	GRAND TOTAL	195,294	100.0

(Curtis, 1993, 150)

The 1962 oil industry law set the institutional framework. In view of the vital importance of oil as the main energy source and the heavy dependency on imports, it was argued that a portion of the domestic oil market should be put under the guidance of the state. The majority of oil firms, including those with foreign capital agreed. (Curtis, 1993, 151)

There were two main reasons why this policy received general support. One was the dominance of the majors in the international oil market. This dominance was so overwhelming that the minority argument which emphasized the need for Japan's exploitation of oil fields overseas with her owns initiative and the construction of tankers, seeking independent steady oil supply, lost favor. Majors were on the whole happy to settle for joint ventures, leaving managerial control in Japanese hands. Despite the development of domestic oil firms, 18 out of 34 firms were joint ventures.

The other reason for state intervention in the oil industry was the strong and growing domestic demand for oil itself. The largest demand in the 1950s came from the steel industry, but after 1960 the power stations became the largest consumer. Their consumption increased with the growth of electricity consumption. The growth of demand in the transport sector was also strong, as well as from the petrochemical industry. Thus during the high speed growth period (1955-1973) there was a general consensus on the vital importance of exercising some control over Japan's oil supplies and the government had strong support for its regulatory policy. (Sugihara, 1993, 3-4)

Between 1962 and 1978, however, MITI's industrial policies had resulted in a decline of foreign ownership of refineries from 70 per cent to 40 per cent. Japan had built up the third largest oil refining industry in the world as early as the second half of the 1960s and development of the industry in terms of capacity continued through the 1970s. (Hamauzu, 1993, 65) In 1967 MITI also established Japan's National Oil Company to play the role of a financial protector institute for improving the Japanese oil exploitation companies in abroad. (SHANA, February 14, 2004) Between 1968 and 1973, the number of Japanese oil exploitation firms rose from 8 to 49 and exploitation and development costs from $44 million to $488 million. The new companies included members from the three biggest industrial groups – Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, plus C. Itoh, and Marubeni. (Nester, 1991, 145) however, because of increased demand of oil during these decades, the amount of Japan's dependency to import oil from major oil companies went up.

B. Japan's Foreign Policy (1945-1973): The Correlation between Change in Oil Policy and the Change in Foreign Policy

In September 1951 fifty-one nations met in San Francisco to reach a peace accord with Japan. When Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 and reentered the international community as an independent nation, it found itself in a world preoccupied by the Cold War between East and West, in which the Soviet Union and the United States headed opposing camps. By virtue of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, ending the state of war between Japan and most of the Allied powers except the Soviet Union and China, and the Mutual Security Assistance Pact between Japan and the United States, signed in San Francisco the same day, Japan essentially became a dependent ally of the United States, which continued to maintain bases and troops on Japan's soil.

Japan's foreign policy goals during most of the early postwar period were essentially to regain economic viability and establish its credibility as a peaceful member of the world community. The cornerstone of Japan's foreign relations from 1945 through today is the United States which provides Japan's military security, its largest market, and sponsorship in the world economy. But the basis of Japan's international relations, based on former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshiad's doctrine, has been the separation of economics and politics (seikei bunri) in the other words, maintaining economic relations without getting involved in any political issues. (Sadria, 2000, 160)

B.1. Japan's Energy Relations with East Asian Countries

Soon after entering the United Nations, Japan set forth its three diplomatic pillars to which it still adheres: UN-centered diplomacy, cooperation with the free (democratic) world, and membership in the Asian community. These principles are all related to the ideals of Japanese diplomacy on multilateralism at both the global and regional level.

A special diplomatic task was to assuage the suspicions and alleviate the resentments of Asian neighbors who had suffered from Japanese colonial rule and imperialist aggression in the past. Japan's diplomacy toward its Asian neighbors, therefore, tended to be extremely low-key, conciliatory, and nonassertive. The first issue of Diplomatic Blue Book in 1957 pointed out good-neighborly relations with Asian countries, the pursuit economic diplomacy and the adjustment of Japan's relations with the United States were the main pillars of Japan's foreign policy. (Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1957: 9)

Japanese multilateralism was based on the emerging tendencies of regionalism in the Asia-pacific region. Japan had not committed any acts of coercive intervention against its neighboring countries in a strategic sense; it had mainly concentrated its interests on economic affairs while being protected by the security umbrella of the United States. (Takeshi, 2006, 67)

With this respect, pioneering work in Indonesia started in 1960, establishing the North Sumatra Oil Company (NOSODECO) with the participation of fifty two corporate investors including the government sponsored overseas oil development companies, overseas economic cooperation fund, electric utilities, iron and steel companies and so on, in order to restore and develop North Sumatran oilfields. The company made an agreement with the

Indonesian government that it would supply the plan, materials and services that were required for the project in exchange for ten years supply of produced oil. It brought in Indonesian oil to Japan until the agreement expired. This venture paved the way for oil exploitation and development by Japan in Indonesia. MITI provided the overseas oil development company with additional funds of 0.2 billion yen in 1962, 0.7 billion yen in 1965 and 2 billion yen in 1966, which enabled it to invest in oil exploitation activities by private companies. The fund was used for oil prospecting in Sabha, the east Kalimantan coast and offshore North Sumatra. (Hamauzu, 1993, 69-70)

Japan also sent a $300 million loan for Suharto newborn government in Indonesia in 1966. Between 1958 and 1969, near 34 per cent of Japanese financial assistances were allocated to Indonesia. On the other hand, during the 1960s, Mitsui and Mitsubishi also invested $120 million in Thailand petrochemical industry. (Kaplan & Mushakoji, 1976, 23)

The Nixon doctrine in 1969 based on decreasing the United States politico-military presence in this region, was also a good reason for increasing Japan's new role in this part of the world. In 1971, five Asian countries (namely South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines) accounted for 53.6 per cent of the total Japan's ODA program, and there was no African or Middle Eastern state among the ten main recipients of the loans. (Shimizu, 1993, 47)

However, although Japan's imports of crude oil from East Asian countries increased from 13.8 per cent in 1950 to 15 per cent in 1960 but regarding to increasing of importing oil by major oil companies, this amount decreased to 13.3 per cent in 1970. (Petroleum Association of Japan, 2007)

B.2. Japan's Energy Relations with African Countries

Until the first oil crisis after the Arab-Israel War in 1973, Japan-Africa relations had been chiefly in the trading field and depended not on governmental initiatives but on private ones. However, unencumbered by the shadow of a colonial past, Japan has been striving to improve relations with African countries. The major relationship was, of course, still in the field of trade.

Although the continent regularly constituted only a small percentage of Japan's overall world market, the trade relationship had constantly increased both in exports and imports. Total Japanese exports rose almost fourfold, from $603 million in 1965 to $2.3 billion in 1973. Also, imports from Africa raised more than five fold in the same period, from $192 million in 1965 to $1 billion in 1973. Such an increase in trade meant that Japan was becoming an important trading partner with Africa during this period.

Under the guidelines of comprehensive security, Japanese companies had taken an active role in promoting Japanese mineral and energy interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Japan's first venture into African oil development was a joint venture between Teikoku, Muanda (Belgium) and Gulf in August 1970 to develop fields in Zaire. In February 1972 a Japanese consortium led by Mitsubishi made up of half of a joint venture with Gabon's government while two other Japanese consortia-led by World Energy Development and C. Itoh Energy Development-joint with the Gabon government in March 1974 to form the Gabon Oil Company. (Nester, 1992, 238-9)

Japanese oil companies also signed a $93 million contract with Algeria for building petrochemical industry with 200000 tones capacity and signed a 49 per cent joint contract for oil exploitation in Nigeria. (Holiday & Mckormag, 1976, 79)

Therefore, Japan tended to trade with such countries regardless of their domestic political problems or of whether a great deal of international criticism was directed against them. However, the amount of oil importing from these countries was negligible; in 1970, Africa exported just 1.3 per cent of Japanese oil needed.

There were, however, a few problems in this trading relationship.

First, the trading pattern had a typically vertical economic structure, in which Japan exported industrial manufacturers and imported raw material. Second, Japanese trade with Africa was regularly unbalanced, with exports running usually at twice the level of imports. Third, trading partners in Africa were limited to countries that had natural resources necessary for Japan. Whether an African country laid natural resources or not was a decisive factor in Japanese trade with that country. (Oda and Aoki, 1985, 133-4)

B.3. Japan's Energy Relations with the Soviet Union in the bygone Bipolar Structure

Until its collapse in 1989, Japan's relations with the Soviet Union continued to be problematic long after the War. The main issue in dispute was the Soviet occupation of what Japan calls its Northern Territories which were seized by the Soviet Union in the closing days of World War II.

However, Japan's policy for providing energy security dictated it to sign an economic contract with USSR for participating in exploitation of natural resources in Sakhalin and East Siberia. During 1964 and 1970 based on bilateral joint projects, Japan exported its oil technology to the Soviet Union and imported raw material. Constructing Vrangol port in Siberian coasts near Nakhodka, developing natural gas projects in Sakhalin near the north borders of Japan and investing in Yakutsk natural gas field, which is placed in the Iceland part of the north Siberia are the most important Japanese activities in the Soviet Union during 1960s. (Holiday and Mckormag, 1976, 289-90)

However, due to the rising tensions in negotiations with the Soviet Union and Japan's energy policy shift to the Middle East oil exporting countries, the amount of oil exported from USSR to Japan decreased from 5.1 per cent in 1960 to 0.2 per cent in 1970 (Petroleum Association of Japan, 2007)

B.4. Japan's Energy Relations with Middle Eastern Countries

In 1952, when Japan regained its sovereignty, Tokyo restored relations with Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Israel. In February 1953, Japan sent the first post war economic mission to the Middle East, visiting Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Saudi Arabia mainly to study the market conditions of these countries.

In fact, Japan's foreign policy of separating economic and political issues was nowhere more utilized than in the Middle East, as Japan's continued access to Middle East oil was the basis of Tokyo policy to the region. The Foreign Ministry's September 1957 Blue Book succinctly stated this principle:

"…it is desirable that peace be maintained in this area in order for commercial relations between Japan and the Middle East to make smooth progress". (Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1957, 10)

Japan's dependence on oil, particularly Middle East oil, expanded steadily with its economy, mostly after 1952 when MITI shifted Japan's energy base from coal to oil. By 1962 Japan was the most important Middle East oil consumer after Britain, and the leading importer from Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. By 1973 Japan was the largest importer of Middle East oil, a dependence that gave its industries a comparative advantage over the United States, which continued to use more expensive domestic reserves.

Japanese dependence on Middle Eastern sources of oil has made it wary of moves that might push it to the forefront in any effort by consumer nations to challenge OPEC. The statement of MITI Minister Nakasone during a visit to Iran in the spring of 1973 that Japan would not join any consumer's group aimed at confronting OPEC was the most clear expression of a view apparently widely shared in the Japanese bureaucracy-well before the Middle East erupted in new crisis.

There were also major changes in the structure of the Japanese import and export trade as well as in the importance of her trading partners between the pre-war and post-war period. These changes were brought about by various factors, including the emergence of new oil-exporting countries, the import substitution policies pursued by certain Middle Eastern states and the transformation of Japan per se from a newly industrialized country with the textile industry as its leading export oriented industry into a major industrial nation with the growth of oil consuming heavy and chemical industries. Such major oil-exporting countries as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait emerged, not only as leading exporters to Japan, but as main importers from her, while populous but oil-poor countries, notably Turkey and Egypt, became her minor trading partners.

During the 1972 fiscal year, ending March 31, 1973, there was a tremendous increase in the growth in Japanese overseas petroleum investment. The Middle Eastern share of Japanese investment jumped from 8 per cent at the end of Japanese FY 1971 to 20 per cent as of March 31, 1973.

During this period, there was an imbalanced rise in the value of Japan's trade with the region. The region's share in total Japanese exports was 4.4 per cent in 1955, but declined to 3.5 per cent in 1965. In 1972 it was 3.6 per cent. These figures were smaller than the 5 per cent of 1935. On the other hand, the Middle East's share in total Japanese imports rose steeply from 2.2 per cent in 1935 to 7.6 per cent in 1955, 11.7 per cent in 1965 and 14.8 per cent in 1972. And Japan continued to have large trade deficits with the region as a whole in the post-war period in sharp contrast with the 1930s. (Shimizu, 1993, 46-7)

Although Japan continues to remain largely dependent on western oil corporations to supply most of its oil needs, during the 1950s Tokyo also attempted in creating domestic oil corporations and negotiating agreements with Middle East governments.

In 1957 and 1958 Japan's Arabian Oil Company (AOC) signed agreements with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, respectively, for offshore drilling rights in return for giving them 56 per cent and 57 per cent of the respective total profits. These agreements represented first steps for both Japan and the Middle East to lessen their dependence on the oil majors. While the major oil companies split profits fifty-fifty with the Middle Eastern countries only on extraction profits, the AOC split total profits with its partners on production, marketing, transportation and refining. The AOC struck oil in 1960 and exported its first oil to Japan by mid-1962. (Tarjomen-e Eghtesadi, June 25, 2001)

Intended to service heavy industry, Arabian oil thus became Japan's first postwar national upstream oil project. By 1964 Arabian oil was supplying 20 per cent of the oil consumed in Japan. This market share was the result of MITI's nationalists' organization of a quota system that forced Japan's oil refiners to purchase inherently unattractive high-sulfur oil produced by Arabian oil. (Campbell, 1985, 142)

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the oil producing Middle Eastern states began to nationalize or participate in the oil industry. And this made it possible for Japan to import crude oil direct from some of them in the early 1970s. In 1969 the Saudi government awarded Chiyoda Chemical Engineering and Construction Company contracts for the expansion of the Jeddah oil refinery and the construction of an oil refinery at Riyadh at the total cost of $127 million. Under the contract agreements with Petromin (General Petroleum and Mineral Organization), the costs were paid to the Japanese company in kind (that is, crude oil). This was the first time that a Japanese company received payment in crude oil for construction work abroad. Furthermore, as the Saudi government began to export oil to foreign countries on a DD (direct deal) basis in the same year, Japanese trading companies were actively engaged in importing such oil and selling it to Japanese oil-refining companies. (Shimizu, 1993, 50-51)

It is however, true that up till the early 1970s Japan's share in the Middle East's total imports of heavy and petro-chemical commodities was comparatively small. This was largely because many of the large infrastructural and industrial projects in the region were undertaken by the well-established western engineering and construction companies which had traditional ties as well as high reputation.

Meanwhile, Japan kept as low a political profile as possible over any Middle East crises before 1973. When called upon by the Arab League to take a stand on the 1956 War, Tokyo responded with the mild statement that the crisis should be settled according to the UN charter and international law. Following the 1967 War, Tokyo supported both United Nations Resolution 242 demanding Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and Resolution 338 which recognized all exiting state's rights to exist including Israel, but not Palestinian rights. (Nester, 1991, 144)

Then on 4 November 1970, Tokyo diplomatically tacked the other way again by voting in favor of Resolution 262 which maintained that peace in the Middle East could only be achieved if the Palestinians' rights were recognized. However, when three Japanese Red Army terrorists with PLO links murdered 26 people and wounded 70 at Tel vive airport in May 1972, Tokyo gave $700000 to the families of the victims to show its regret at the actions of Japanese citizens, even though they were enemies of the Japanese government.

During the late 1960s and into the 1970s Tokyo also tried to shift increased amounts of its oil imports from the Arab states to Iran to avoid any possible disruptions arising from the Arab-Israeli conflicts. In 1967, mineral fuels (mainly crude oil) accounted for 98.2 per cent of Iran's total exports to Japan. (Odell, 1979, 146) By 1970 more than half of Japan's oil shipments through the Hormuz strait came from Iran.

Tokyo continually tried to avoid any real or emotional links with regional conflicts, a policy symbolized by the Foreign Ministry's delay in creating a Middle East-African section until 1961, and not elevating it into a Bureau until 1965.[1] Despite Japan's growing

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1. Kazuo Chiba, the deputy director of Middle East office of Japan's Foreign Ministry, has noted about this section:

"…then disaster struck in the form of the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956. Suddenly we were forcibly made aware of oil through its shortages. …the Foreign Ministry

economic dependence on the Middle East, no prime minister or foreign minister visited the Middle East before the 1973 crisis. (Nester, 1992, 209) Japan had opened its embassies only in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the Japanese ambassador in Kuwait also was accredited in Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and UAE. (Siasat-e Khareji/, Summer 1999, 569)

However, Japan made full use of abundant, cheep oil for its industrial development, paying little serious attention to the security of oil supply. The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 and 1967, which caused a substantial rise in oil prices in Western Europe owing to longer haulage, did not warn the Japanese of the danger of depending on the Middle East as the mainstay of their energy supply. They had not learnt any lessons from the European experience during the two Suez wars, such as the necessity of maintaining a strategic stockpile. They simply believed that disruption of oil supplies to Japan was a remote possibility.

Japan's Imports of Crude Oil by Origin

Source	1950	1960	1970
Middle East*	17,329	450,333	2,787009
(Iran)	464	20,678	1,507,554
(Saudi Arabia)	14,546	105,600	494,182

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had started up a subsection called the Middle Eastern Room, not even a division. It was a very small room and there was the chief, a not very senior man sitting at the head of the long table, and there were some young men sitting around. The genesis of our Middle Eastern policy began in this room. The people who were seated there were later to become very important people; one of the most junior people is our famous ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who was in the past Director General of the Middle Eastern Bureau.

Our Middle Eastern policy's basic thrust was typically Japanese, in that we tried to achieve consensus and not to court controversy. The Suez Crisis had come and gone and the Middle Eastern room had become a Middle Eastern section, and later divided into two, the present first Middle Eastern division which deals with the Arab-Israeli dispute and the main protagonist countries and the second Middle Eastern division, which deals with the rest including the main oil producers. I was made deputy director of the Middle Eastern section, and in those days it was rather difficult to get good information about the Middle East, but we tried hard." (Chiba, 1993, 146)

(Natural Zone)	-	34,232	363,683
(Kuwait)	2,319	215,714	313,808
(Iraq)	-	71,884	-
(UAE)	-	-	201,497
(Qatar)	-	2,225	3,553
(Oman)	-	-	102,732
(North Yemen)	-	-	-
South-east Asia	4,420	85,644	472,755
China	-	-	-
Africa	-	-	47,771
USSR	-	29,114	9,946
Others	10,146	2,541	12,968
Total	31,895	567,632	3,330,449

(Petroleum Association of Japan, 2007)

Note: The figures for the Middle East refer to the total of all the countries in parentheses.

Conclusion

A review on Japan's foreign policies to maintain its energy security in this research clearly demonstrates that although Japanese politicians tried to avoid dependency to other international actors for improving their national security in this field, however, the main discourse of energy security approach in this country was based on "increased dependency" to importing raw materials, and especially oil, from major oil companies and state powers who all belonged to the western bloc of the bipolarity era. Japan's commitment to this bloc and its eco-military dependency to the American security Umbrella, made it to accept the new definition of world system based on an American outlook.

In fact, American consideration for Japan, and American encouragement to Japanese protectionism, arose with the coming of the Cold War to East Asia. Geographically, Japan was neighboring of two great communist powers of the world, USSR and China. This gave Japan a strategic situation interacting between the East and the West blocs. (Varedi, 1995, 12)

With the fall of China to communists in 1949, American "Cold Warriors" such as George F. Kenan emphasized that the West needed a strong Japan as its Asian Bastion. (Barnhart, 1995: 168) These events had a decisive impact on Japan's future, making its security dependent upon the politico-military and economic systems of the free world for whose maintenance the United States was primarily responsible. Gradually, Japan's economic reconstruction and its new role as an important western ally in East Asia became the main American strategy to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding in this region. Another result of this policy was Japan's commitment to the American new world order. (Levin, 1993, 202)

Regarding to these matters, it seems that in spite of Japanese struggles to get ride of dependency to the seven sisters' oil companies and improving direct relations with energy producing and exporting countries in this period, the main principles of its foreign policy dictated this country to be faithful to the dominant discourse of international system of energy security during the years of 1945-1973.

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